We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring an ambiguous state distribution. Equilibrium behavior of both sender (S) and receiver (R) features mixing and we relate each agent's randomization to a specific mode of ambiguous communication. For sufficiently high ambiguity, implementing the S-optimal decision rule with only two messages is impossible if R has aligned preferences. This may in contrast be possible if R has misaligned preferences. Adding a little ambiguity may generate influential communication that is unambiguously advantageous to S.
Introduction
Many situations of advice feature uncertainty about the prior distribution of the state of the world. In medical advice, the distribution of a particular disease across ethnic groups may be unclear. In financial advice, the process governing the value of a given asset may be unknown. We examine a binary cheap talk model featuring Knightean prior uncertainty as well as ambiguity averse agents and we address the following questions. A preliminary standard result is that agents strictly favour randomization for intermediate (and thereby inconclusive) signal realizations, which allows to hedge in the face of ambiguity. We start by focusing on equilibria that implement the optimal decision rule of S (S-optimal equilibria). Our main objective is to establish the comparative statics of the set of S-optimal equilibria with respect to preference misalignment, message space cardinality and the ambiguity level. In our binary model, the natural measure of preference misalignment between sender (S) and receiver (R) is β = q S q R , where q i 2 (0, 1) describes i's relative sensitivity to type I and II errors (β 0 as we assume q R q S ). The level of ambiguity is captured by a one dimensional parameter.
Our first main finding is that it is without loss of generality to concentrate on so-called threshold equilibria. In the latter, S sends at most three messages and his communication strategy is described by three thresholds and mixing probabilities computed on the basis of q S and q R . In threshold equilibria S occasionally randomizes and his strategy cannot be described as a partitional strategy à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS) but only as mixing over a set of partitional strategies. R also typically randomizes. We interpret randomization by respectively S and R as embodying two different modes of ambiguous communication.
Our next class of findings concerns the impact of the message space cardinality on the existence of S-optimal equilibria. If three messages are available, for any ambiguity level there is a maximal bias e β 2 (0, 1) such that an S-optimal equilibrium exists if and only if β e β. Given high ambiguity, three messages are necessary for the existence of an S-optimal equilibrium independently of bias β. Given intermediate ambiguity there
is always an interval of biases h β, β i satisfying β < e β for which two messages suffice. It may furthermore be the case that β > 0, meaning that a low bias renders three messages necessary. Finally, given low ambiguity two messages are always sufficient.
We add four remarks on the above class of findings. First, given intermediate ambiguity perfectly manipulating R thus requires more sophisticated language as β increases from β 2 h β, β i to β 0 2 (β, e β]. In this case, if we pick the S-optimal equilibrium as our prediction for the game, more bias thus implies richer equilibrium language. This reverses the prediction of the CS cheap talk model if we pick the finest equilibrium as the salient prediction for the latter model. A second remark is that under high (resp. intermediate) ambiguity the S-optimal equilibrium for sure (resp. potentially) does not exist if S and R have identical preferences and only two messages are available. This is counterintuitive and we term this the Doppelgänger Paradox. A third remark is that under intermediate ambiguity the Doppelgänger Paradox, if arising, is compounded by the existence of an S-optimal equilibrium if R is moderately biased (i.e. β 2 h β, β i ). A misaligned R is thus preferable to S than a perfectly aligned R. We term this the strong Doppelgänger Paradox.
A fourth and final remark is that the above features do not obtain in the absence of ambiguity. In a model featuring two actions, two messages always suffice to implement the (potentially mixed) S-optimal decision rule if S and R have identical preferences.
A third main finding is that there typically now also exist influential communication equilibria that do not implement the S-optimal decision rule, in contrast to the case of no ambiguity. A fourth main finding is that adding a little ambiguity, starting from no ambiguity, can generate the possibility of influential communication and additionally be unambiguously beneficial to S.
Literature review Ambiguous language arguably lacks a theoretical explanation: Existing models that explicitly purport to study ambiguous communication actually generate vagueness (see for example Alesina and Cukierman (1990) , Aragonès and Neeman (2000) , Callander and Wilson (2008) , Tomz and Van Houweling (2009) ). In contrast, we find the forms of randomization (by S and R) featured in S-optimal equilibria of our game reminiscent of two common modes of ambiguous communication. In this light, we provide a simple account of ambiguous language as the equilibrium implication of ambiguity
The model
There are two agents, a sender S and a receiver R. The state of the world ω 2 fA, Bg has a subjectively uncertain distribution represented by a set [P l (B), P h (B)] of prior probabilities of state B. We assume that P h (B) = 1 2 + e and P l (B) = 1 2 e, for some e 2 0, 1 2 . R can choose among two actions a and b.
Preferences given a unique prior In the absence of ambiguity the preferences of each agent i 2 fS, Rg are described by a parameter q i 2 (0, 1) which denotes an agent's relative aversion to type I and type I I errors. Payoffs to agent i 2 fS, Rg are given by π i (b, A) = q i , π i (a, B) = (1 q i ) and π i (a, A) = π i (b, B) = 0. Define P k (B j θ) as the posterior probability of B given information event θ and prior P k (B) 2 fP l (B), P h (B)g. Define E k (π i (j, ω) j θ) as the expected payoff of action j for agent i given information event θ
and prior P k (B) 2 fP l (B), P h (B)g:
meaning that for a given prior P k (B) and a given information event θ, an ambiguity neutral agent i strictly favours action b over a if P k (B j θ) > q i and a over b if P k (B j θ) < q i .
An ambiguity neutral agent thus always strictly prefers a pure action except in the knifeedge case where q i = P k (B j θ). Preference parameters q S and q R are public information and q R q S .
Preferences given multiple priors Let (α a , α b ) denote the mixed action assigning probability α a to a and probability α b to b. An agent chooses the mixed action (α a , α b ) that maximizes the minimal expected payoff across all possible priors given information event θ.
Letting ∆ ab be the set of all distributions over the action space fa, bg , α satisfies α 2 arg max Note that in characterizing the Max-Min action we trivially only need to consider the most extreme (updated) priors P l (B j θ) and P h (B j θ) because the expected payoff of action j is increasing in the probability of state J. It is easily seen that the Max-Min action α is characterized as follows. If P h (B jθ ) < q then α a = 1. If P l (B jθ ) < q < P h (B jθ ) then α a = q. If q < P l (B jθ ) then α a = 0. If P h (B jθ ) = q there is a set of Max-Min actions defined by α a 2 [q, 1] . If P l (B jθ ) = q there is a set of Max-Min actions defined by
Information structure S receives a one dimensional signal σ drawn from a state de-
We allow both for a bounded domain (for example [σ, σ] = [0, 1]) or an unbounded domain (for example σ = ∞ and σ = +∞). F A (σ) and F B (σ) are such that
is strictly increasing in σ, thus satisfying the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). We introduce the following useful condition on the distribution of signals:
For σ 2 fσ, σg, the above inequality conditions hold true with weak inequalities.
Assumption 1 is equivalent to log-concavity of the inverse Mills ratios if for all σ, f B (σ) = f A (σ c) for some positive constant c. An instance of this is when f B and f A are two normal distributions with identical variance and means µ A < µ B .
Assumption 2:
It holds true that lim
Assumption 2 is satisfied for a pair of normals as described above. Assumptions 1 and 2 are also satisfied if
2 (which will be assumed together with [σ, σ] = [0, 1] in our figures).
Communication protocol and equilibrium
The timing of the game G is given as follows. At 0, Nature draws the state ω. At 1, Nature draws a signal according to F ω . At 2, S issues a message. At 3, R chooses an action. S can communicate costlessly with R by emitting a message m 2 M, where M is a set of cardinality n 2 in which individual messages are numbered m 1 , ..., m n . A communication strategy δ of S specifies for each signal σ a distribution (δ 1 (σ), .., δ n (σ)) over messages belonging to M, where δ j (σ) is the probability of sending m j . A decision strategy ρ of R specifies a distribution (ρ a (m), ρ b (m)) over fa, bg for each possible message m in M. A Weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game G is given by: 1) a communication strategy δ of S, 2) a decision strategy ρ of R and 3) a system of beliefs satisfying the following two requirements. First, δ and ρ are sequentially rational given the system of beliefs. Second, posterior beliefs for both S and R are generated whenever possible by using prior-by-prior Bayesian updating using equilibrium strategies.
Sequential rationality of ρ implies that R picks an action in the set of Max-Min actions given the posteriors fP l (B jm, δ ), P h (B jm, δ )g . Let E k (π S jm, ρ, σ ) denote the expected payoff of S under the prior P k (B) at information set σ if R uses the decision strategy ρ. Let ∆ M be the set of all distributions over M. Sequential rationality of δ requires that at any signal σ δ 2 arg max
We say that an equilibrium is influential if there exist two equilibrium messages m and m 0 that trigger different beliefs and actions (i.e. ρ a (m) 6 = ρ a (m 0 )). We say that two equilibria are outcome-equivalent if they implement the same decision rule, i.e. the same mapping from [σ, σ] to the set ∆ ab of distributions over fa, bg. Outcome equivalence thus does not take into account how a given distribution over fa, bg is attached to a given signal σ in equilibrium, i.e. who randomizes.
The expected Max-Min payoff of agent i at σ in equilibrium ϕ is the expected value of the Max-Min payoff obtained by i given σ in ϕ. To exemplify the concept, consider an equilibrium ϕ in which conditional on signal σ, R receives message m 1 with probability p 1 (σ) and m 2 with probability p 2 (σ)
. We say that two equilibria ϕ and e ϕ are σ-interim payoff equivalent for agent i if he obtains the same expected Max-Min payoff at every σ 2 [σ, σ] in ϕ and e ϕ. We say that equilibrium ϕ σ-interim payoff dominates equilibrium e ϕ for agent i if for every signal σ, agent i obtains a weakly higher expected Max-Min Payoff (with strict inequality for some signal) in ϕ than in e ϕ.
Note that in the presence of ambiguity, two equilibria may be outcome equivalent without being σ-interim payoff equivalent for a given agent i.
The next section provides an analysis of our model. A subsequent section shows that our model is formally equivalent to one involving a continuum of pure actions.
Analysis

Opening remarks
We start with a characterization of agents' optimal decision rules. Given Assumption 2, there exist for each agent i and ambiguity level e 2 0, 1 2 two thresholds t 1 i (e) 2 (σ, σ) and t 2 i (e) 2 (σ, σ) satisfying the following
Note that lim . Each agent i thus has a (continuum) set of optimal decision rules that differ only regarding the action picked at the measure zero events σ = t 1 i (e) and σ = t 2 i (e). For all practical purposes (i.e. implementability and payoffs) all rules in this set are identical and slightly abusing vocabulary we shall henceforth define as the S-optimal decision rule the rule in this set that specifies action (q S , 1 q S ) at σ = t 1 S (e) and σ = t 2 S (e). On a technical note, it is immediate that for any e > 0 we have t 1 R (e) < t 1 S (e) and t 2 R (e) < t 2 S (e) if q R < q S . 1 F ω (t 2 S (e)) = 0.
Let t S = lim e!0 t 1 S (e) = lim e!0 t 2 S (e). Equilibrium behavior in the absence of ambiguity is very simple except in the knife-edge case P(B jσ t S ) ) = q R . If there exists an equilibrium featuring influential communication then it implements S's optimal decision rule which is furthermore deterministic. S simply announces truthfully his favoured action by sending m 1 when favouring a and m 2 when favouring b. R takes action a after m 1 and b after m 2 .
This equilibrium only exists if R is willing to take action a after m 1 , which requires that q R is not excessively low 1 .
In what follows, we perform an analysis of the set of influential equilibria under ambiguity. The set consists of two separate subsets, those equilibria that implement the S-optimal decision rule (S-optimal equilibria) and those that do not.
S-optimal equilibria
We start with the following two observations. Lemma 1 a) If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium satisfying the following. No more than three messages are sent. Conditional on a given equilibrium message, R either picks pure action a or pure action b or mixed action (q R , 1 q R ).
b) If q R < q S , there exists no S-optimal equilibrium in which S never randomizes.
The intuition behind a) is that one can w.l.o.g. focus on S-optimal equilibria in which R only takes three different actions: (1, 0), (0, 1) and (q R , 1 q R ). A full proof is given in the Appendix. The argument behind b) is as follows. For intermediate signal realizations S favours the mixed action (q S , 1 q S ) . In a putative S-optimal equilibrium in which S would never randomize, one message would have to trigger mixed action (q S , 1 q S ).
Yet we show in the proof of a) that there cannot exist an S-optimal equilibrium in which R chooses this mixed action.
Exhaustively characterizing the set of S-optimal equilibria is both daunting and unnecessary for our purposes. We now introduce a simple subclass of S-optimal equilibria and show that we may w.l.o.g. restrict ourselves to it. In what follows, note that we simply write t i S instead of t i S (e) whenever no confusion can arise. Threshold equilibria feature a communication strategy that is entirely described by the three thresholds t 1 S , z, t 2 S and a set of mixing probabilities. We call such a strategy a threshold communication strategy. A threshold equilibrium in which z = t 1 S implies the emission with positive probability of exactly two messages while any remaining threshold equilibrium implies that three messages are emitted with positive probability. Given q S , q R , e, let P k (B jm i , z ) denote the conditional probability of B implied by m i given prior P k (B) and the threshold strategy z.
Definition 1 Threshold equilibrium
All threshold equilibria are outcome equivalent as they all implement S's optimal decision rule. Though not stated explicitly in what follows, note that the set of threshold equilibria typically constitutes a continuum. Many different threshold communication strategies of S allow him to optimally guide R's actions. This multiplicity reflects the fact that there are two ways to trigger the optimal randomization by R in threshold equilibria, a simple and a more sophisticated way. The first is to randomize between m 1 and m 2 . The second is to randomize between m 1 and m 3 (where m 3 leads to randomization by R). The two ways are perfect substitutes for S.
All threshold equilibria are σ-interim payoff equivalent for S but this is not the case for R though no σ-interim payoff dominance relation appears to trivially hold across threshold equilibria. By transiting from threshold z to z 0 > z, R's expected Max-Min payoff increases for sure for any σ / 2 [z, z 0 ) but may instead decrease for σ 2 [z, z 0 ). In a threshold equilibrium, m 1 and m 2 yield a Max-Min payoff strictly larger than q R (1 q R ) which is furthermore respectively decreasing in P h (B jm 1 , z ) and increasing in P l (B jm 2 , z ). We attach three technical remarks on the randomization performed by S in threshold equilibria and S-optimal equilibria in general. First, in the classical CS model, any partitional equilibrium can be reinterpreted as an equilibrium in which S mixes between messages, but such mixing only involves messages that cause identical beliefs and identical actions. The involved mixing is therefore unnecessary as opposed to the mixing that appears in the S-optimal equilibria of our model, which cannot be disposed of as shown in Lemma 1.b). Second, the randomization performed by S in S-optimal equilibria differs from that featured in the noisy talk model of Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007) to the extent that randomization in our model is voluntary while it is exogenously generated in the noisy talk model. Third, the mixing performed by S in a threshold equilibrium can be reinterpreted as mixing over a set of classical partitional communication strategies upon observation of his private signal.
We wish to characterize the comparative statics of the set of S-optimal equilibria. Key questions are: 1) What are the values of q R compatible with the existence of an S-optimal equilibrium and how do these values vary as a function of the ambiguity level e? 2) Does S sometimes need strictly more than two messages to implement his optimal decision rule? Proposition 1 below implies that in seeking to answer the above questions, we may restrict ourselves without loss of generality to the subset of threshold equilibria.
Proposition 1 S-optimal equilibria and threshold equilibria a) If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists a threshold equilibrium.
b) Given only two available messages, any S-optimal equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium with threshold t 1 S .
Point a) is proved in the Appendix. The proof of b) is as follows. In an S-optimal equilibrium featuring only two equilibrium messages, one message (say m 1 ) must trigger action a for sure and another (say m 2 ) must trigger b for sure. This is necessary to allow S to induce a for sure below t 1 S and b for sure above t 2 S . There being no third message available, it follows that for σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 S S randomizes with probability (q S , 1 q S ) between m 1 and m 2 . The described strategy profile is a threshold equilibrium profile with threshold
Before stating our characterizations in the next two propositions we introduce constants e 1 , e 2 , e 12 , e 13 2 0, 1 2 which shall constitute building blocks of our statements. Given q S , q R , e, let P k (B jm i , z, e ) denote the conditional probability of B implied by m i given prior P k (B) and the threshold strategy z. Given any quintuple q S , q R , e, i, k, it can be shown that lim
is independent of q R . Slightly abusing notation, we let
is s.t. as e increases,
P h (B m 1 , t 1 S (e), e ) crosses q S from below at e 1 . e 2 is s.t. as e increases, P l (B m 2 , t 1 S (e), e ) crosses q S from above at e 2 . e 13 is s.t. as e increases P h (B m 1 , t 1 S (e), e ) crosses P l (B m 3 , t 1 S (e), e ) from below at e = e 13 . Finally, e 12 is s.t P h (B m 1 , t 1 S (e), e ) crosses P l (B m 2 , t 1 S (e), e ) from below at e = e 12 . The constants satisfy the following. First, if e 1 6 = e 2 then e 12 is strictly between e 1 and e 2 while if e 1 = e 2 then e 12 = e 1 . Second, e 13 < minfe 12 , e 1 g. Note that the constants are constructed for a fixed q S and fixed distributions F A and F B . For more detail, we refer to the Online Appendix.
The following proposition offers a characterization of the comparative statics of the set of S-optimal equilibria in the presence of three messages.
Proposition 2 S-optimal equilibria (three messages available)
Suppose that three messages are available.
i. Fix q S . For any given e there is a strictly positive threshold q R (e) < q S such that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium if and only if q R 2
ii. For all e e 13 , q R (e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e.
Proof: see in Appendix.
Point i. implies that an S-optimal equilibrium exists if and only if q R is not too low relative to q S . Point ii. shows that when three messages are available, increasing ambiguity is not helpful in so far as S's ability to implement his optimal decision rule is concerned.
In certain situations, communication is restricted to the use binary messages. An expert may for example be allowed only to say "yes" or "no". We now characterize the set of conflict levels under which S-optimal communication remains possible under this restriction. Note in what follows that q R (e) is the lower bound defined in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 S-optimal equilibria (only two messages available)
Suppose that exactly two messages are available.
i. Let q S be such that e 2 < e 1 . The following holds true.
i.a) If e > e 12 , there exists no S-optimal equilibrium for any q R while instead if e e 12 , there are strictly positive thresholds q 0 R (e) and q
exists an S-optimal equilibrium if and only if q R 2 On the usefulness of a third message Proposition 3 shows that the absence of a third message hurts S in terms of his ability to implement his optimal decision rule whenever ambiguity is sufficiently high. We focus on the statements of i., those of ii. being qualitatively virtually identical with one exception which is discussed later. Point i.a) shows that if ambiguity is large (e > e 12 ), the S-optimal rule can never be implemented in the absence of a third message. Points i.b) and i.c) show that if e is smaller than e 12 , there is a closed interval
i of values of q R such that an S-optimal equilibrium exists if and only if q R belongs to this interval. Point i.b) shows that the lower bound q 0
is strictly higher than q R (e) if e 2 (e 13 , e 12 ) and i.c) states that the upper bound q 0 R (e) is strictly smaller than q S if e 2 (e 2 , e 12 ). If e 2 (max fe 13, e 2 g , e 12 ) , a third message is thus useful if and only if R is either very aligned or very misaligned. For e minfe 13, e 2 g, on the other hand, a third message is always superfluous. Finally, i.c) shows that given only two messages, adding a little ambiguity in the environment is never helpful in so far as S's ability to implement his optimal decision rule is concerned. Indeed, the bounds q 0
and q 0 R (e) are respectively increasing and decreasing in e. At an abstract level, the usefulness of a third message derives from the following two features of the game. First, given ambiguity aversion agents' optimal decision rules involve three types of behavior, either a or b or mixing. Both agents favour a when the signal is low, b when it is high, and hedging (though with different probabilities) when it is intermediate. If ambiguity is high, there is a common interval of signal realizations where both agents want to randomize. For S, being able to convey whether he wants to randomize can thus naturally be helpful. If ambiguity is instead low, there is no common interval of signals for which both agents want to randomize.
A Doppelgänger Paradox A salient aspect of our characterization is that for e large enough (a sufficient condition being e min fe 1 , e 12 g), there exists no S-optimal equilibrium for q S = q R when S is restricted to using only two messages. We call this phenomenon Doppelgänger Paradox and add some remarks on this in what follows.
First, if q R = q S , one would expect that there exists a threshold equilibrium with threshold t 1 S (e), thus making the restriction to two messages inconsequential. The intuition for this would be as follows. In such a putative equilibrium, R chooses a after m 1 and b after m 2 . S simply randomizes optimally between m 1 and m 2 whenever σ 2 t 1 S (e), t 2 S (e) and otherwise chooses m 1 or m 2 . R, recognizing that his optimal decision rule coincides with that of S, should have no deviation incentive. This intuition is however wrong.
Under the assumed updating rule, R simply applies his own optimal (ambiguity averse) Max-Min best response to the received message. The fact that in the postulated equilibrium S has already acted in a way that maximized his own (ambiguity averse) preferences is immaterial. The fact that in equilibrium S successfully hedges against ambiguity does not imply that R is also hedged against ambiguity. The key here is the dynamic inconsistency of R's behavior given the assumed updating rule. Following Hanany and Klibanoff (2007) one could alleviate the paradox by excluding certain priors at certain information sets of R.
For comparison, consider a Bayesian game under expected utility between two players (1 and 2) each endowed with two actions. Assume that in equilibrium, agent 1 randomizes for some types. Suppose that agent 1 cannot act himself but needs to act through a third agent (R) with identical preferences (a Doppelgänger). Communication between agent 1 and R is cheap talk. Under expected utility, a third message would never be necessary to allow agent 1 to implement his desired decision rule through R. Agent 1 would simply optimally randomize between two messages inducing pure actions by R and the latter would have no incentive to deviate.
A second specificity of the model is that given only two messages, an increased preference misalignment can be helpful for S. Given q S such that e 2 < e 1 and e 2 (e 2 , e 12 ], an S-optimal equilibrium does not exist for q R = q S but exists for an interval of values of q R strictly smaller than q S (see Figure 1) . One might call this the strong Doppelgänger paradox. Note that the latter does not arise if e 2 e 1 (corresponding to Point ii. in Proposition 3). Under expected utility, an increase in R's bias would in contrast always hurt S for any fixed message space cardinality.
Interpreting S-optimal equilibria The randomization performed by respectively S or by R in threshold equilibria relates to two common modes of ambiguous communication, each offering an instance of the multiplicity of interpretations that is in our view the essence of ambiguous language. The first mode operates through the ambiguity arising in deriving the implications of the perceived language through a process of introspection We expand on the first mode in what follows. In a threshold equilibrium with z > t 1 S (e), when S sends the partitional message m 3 that gives rise to randomization by R, this is somewhat equivalent to S taking an agnostic stance, stating "I recommend neither a nor b." or "Whether a or b is optimal is a matter of perspective.". A caveat is that m 3 is admittedly a classical partitional message à la Crawford and Sobel (1982) We now comment on the second mode. When S mixes between messages triggering different beliefs and responses, this bears some similarity to the choice of versatile formulations that give rise to a distribution over perceived statements. Suppose that besides the classical messages m 1 , m 2 and m 3 , S also has access to non standard messages which induce a distribution over the observation by R of respectively m 1 , m 2 and m 3 . Let e m(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) induce R to see m i with probability x i for i = 1, 2, 3, with
Call any such message a noisy message and let it be common knowledge that S has access to a rich set of such messages, one for each (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) s.t. if σ 2 t 1 S , z and the noisy message e m(q S , 1 q S , 0) if σ 2 z, t 2 S . We add two remarks on equilibria featuring noisy messages. First, note that R is aware of the fact that these messages are being used. He recognizes that he sees a standard message m 1 , m 2 or m 3 but that S may in fact have sent a noisy message. Equilibria featuring noisy messages thus involve fully rational agents. Second, the use of noisy messages allows to solve the implicit commitment problem inherent to the randomization performed by S. Recall that a Max-Min decision maker is typically not indifferent between the two actions that he randomizes between if randomization is optimal. Noisy messages in essence allow S to delegate the task of randomizing to an outside garbling device.
Non S-optimal equilibria
Recall that the set of influential and non S-optimal equilibria is generically empty in the absence of ambiguity. This is not the case anymore in the presence of ambiguity. Decision rule D(q S , q R , e) is defined as follows. Action a is picked with probability q R if σ < t 2 S (e). b is played with probability one if σ t 2 S (e). Consider the following strategy profile which implements D. S emits m 1 if σ < t 2 S (e) and m 2 if σ t 2 S (e). 
The virtues of a little ambiguity
In what follows, we let q R (0) = lim e!0 q R (e) , where q R (e) is the lower bound defined in Proposition 2. Recall that in the absence of ambiguity (e = 0), only the babbling equilibrium exists given q R < q R (0). For q R slightly below q R (0) , the next proposition evaluates the welfare properties of the influential communication rendered possible by the addition of a little ambiguity. To that end, we compare the expected payoff obtained by agent i in the babbling equilibrium under no ambiguity to that obtained by i in the simple D-equilibrium under ambiguity level e when applying his most adverse prior.
There is an e > 0 and for any e 2 (0, e ) there is a threshold b q R (e) < q R (0) such that if e 2 (0, e ) and q R 2
a) The simple D-equilibrium exists.
b) For any prior P (B) 2 P e l (B), P e h (B) the expected utility of S is strictly larger in the simple D-equilibrium than in the babbling equilibrium in the absence of ambiguity.
Our proposition shows that for q R close enough to q R (0) and e small enough, the addition of a little ambiguity not only generates the possibility of influential communication but also ensures S an increase in expected payoff under any prior in P e l (B), P e h (B) . This conclusion does not apply for R who may well lose under both priors from the transition to positive ambiguity and influential communication. 
Extension to a continuum of actions
We now show that our model is formally equivalent to a model involving a continuum of pure actions. We refer to the jury interpretation of our setup. Let states A and B correspond to the defendant being respectively innocent and guilty. Define furthermore T as the maximal detention time (in years) to which the latter can be sentenced. For every
, let action x consist in detaining the defendant for xT years. Given a state ω 2 fA, Bg and a given action x 2 [0, 1], let payoffs to agent i 2 fS, Rg be given by
as the expected payoff of action x for agent i given information event θ and prior P k (B), we now have:
Note two features. Within this modified model, the expected payoff of the pure action
x is the same as the expected payoff of the mixed action assigning probability x to pure action 1 and 1 x to 0. Secondly, (3) is the expected payoff of the mixed action (1 x, x) in our original model. It follows trivially from this second observation that the optimal decision rule of an agent in this setup mirrors the one featured in the original model given P k (B j θ). First, choose 0 for sure if P h (B jθ ) < q. Second, choose pure action 1 q or randomize over f0, 1g with probability (q,
For every threshold equilibrium with threshold z in the original model, there is an outcome equivalent equilibrium in this model that differs from the former only to the extent that R now picks the pure action 1 q R instead of randomizing, thus avoiding the implicit commitment problem associated with randomization in the original model. In contrast, S can still not dispense of mixing between equilibrium messages, which shows that mixing is not an artefact of the binary action space assumed in the original setup.
Lemma 2 There exists no S-optimal equilibrium in which S never randomizes between messages.
Proof: Identical to that of Lemma 1.b) and therefore omitted.
Conclusion
We have established the basic properties of a simple binary cheap talk model within an ambiguous environment. From a formal perspective, the main novel feature of equilibria is that S often randomizes between messages that trigger different (pure or mixed) actions by R. The communication strategy of S is thus not reducible to a simple partitional strategy. Other key properties relate to the comparative statics effect of interest misalignment, language richness and exogenous ambiguity. Outline
Step 1 shows that we can restrict ourselves to equilibria in which any given action of R is triggered only by one equilibrium message.
Step 2 shows that there cannot exist an S-Optimal equilibrium in which R after some message chooses a mixed action (α, 1 α)
Step 3 shows that it is w.l.o.g. to assume that no message triggers a mixed action (α, 1 α) s.t. α 2 (0, q R ) and concludes.
We recall the following notation. Given communication strategy δ we denote by δ i (σ) the likelihood that message m i is sent given signal σ. Assuming that communication strategy δ uses finitely many messages given by m 1 , .., m n , it thus holds true that
for any σ. We denote a given communication strategy by δ = (δ 1 , δ 2 , .., δ n ).
Step 1 Let δ be featured in an S-optimal equilibrium E. Assume that given δ, m r and m r 0 are both sent with positive probability and trigger the same mixed action (α, 1 α). Consider the strategy e δ constructed as follows. Set e δ r (σ) = δ r (σ) + δ r 0 (σ) and e δ r 0 (σ) = 0. Set e δ r 00 (σ) = δ r 00 (σ) for any r 00 6 = r, r 0 . There exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring δ 0 .
Proof: Note that given ω, r,r 0 it holds true that P(m r ω, e δ ) = P(m r jω, δ ) + P(m r 0 jω, δ ).
Suppose that m r and m r 0 trigger pure action a given δ. Then it must be that for s = r, r 0
It follows from the above inequality, (4) and the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) that
We may thus conclude that given e δ, action a is optimal after m r . Suppose that m r and m r 0 trigger a mixed action (α, 1 α) s.t. α 2 (q R , 1) given δ. Then it must be that for
It follows from the above equality, (4) and the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) that
We may thus conclude that given e δ, the mixed action (α, 1 α) is optimal after m r .
Suppose that m r and m r 0 trigger mixed action (q R , 1 q R ) given δ. Then it must be that for
It follows from the above double inequality, (4) and the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) that
We may thus conclude that given e δ, the mixed action (q R , 1 q R ) is optimal after m r .
The same argument can be used to analyze the remaining possible equilibrium actions.
Step 2 There exists no S-optimal equilibrium featuring an equilibrium message m r that satisfies the following. First, it is not only sent for σ = t 1 R . Second, it triggers a mixed action of R specifying that a is picked with a probability belonging to (q R , 1).
Proof: Assume an S-optimal equilibrium E featuring a message m r not only sent for
) . For such a mixed action to be part of the set of Max-Min actions, m r must trigger belief q R when applying prior P h (B). Given that m r triggers this belief and that m r is not sent only if σ = t 1 R , it follows that m r must be sent with strictly positive probability for some σ < t 1 R as well as for some σ > t 1 R . If this is true, then the S-optimal decision rule is however not implemented in E given that b is taken with positive probability for some σ < t 1 R t 1 S .
Step 3 If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium in which no equilibrium message triggers a mixed action (α, 1 α) satisfying α 2 (0, q R ).
Proof: Assume that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium E that features δ. By steps 1 and 2, it is without loss of generality to assume that m 1 (m 2 ) is the unique message that triggers a (b) for sure, m 3 is the unique message triggering (q R , 1 q R ) while for any r 4, m r is the unique message triggering (α r , 1 α r ) satisfying α r 2 (0, q R ) . Denote the strategy profile featured in E by ϕ.
We now construct a strategy profile ϕ 0 that constitutes an S-optimal equilibrium E 0 that is such that that for some particular r 4 (call it e r), the mixed action (α e r , 1 α e r ) is never triggered in equilibrium. Note that it follows that δ 0 e r (σ) 0 and δ
. Profile ϕ 0 assigns the following strategy to R. Pick the mixed action (q R , 1 q R ) after m e r . After any other message, pick the same action as in the S-optimal equilibrium E.
We briefly recall some properties of the equilibrium E before checking incentives of S and R in the putative equilibrium E 0 . First, the probabilities δ 3 (σ) , δ 4 (σ) , .. can only be strictly positive if σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 S . Also, δ 1 (σ) = 1 below t 1 S and δ 2 (σ) = 1 above t 2 S . Moreover, in E message m r triggers belief q R when applying the prior P l (B), for any r 4.
We now verify that the constructed strategy δ 0 defines a probability distribution over messages for any σ. We only need to consider σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 S . Note that The above equality is true since
The last equality follows because δ is S-optimal.
We now check incentives of R in the putative equilibrium E 0 . Recall that in the Soptimal equilibrium E,
Given that for any σ δ 0 e r (σ) simply equals δ e r (σ) multiplied by a constant, it follows that in equilibrium E 0 message m e r triggers belief q R when applying the prior P l (B). R is thus willing to play a with probability q R after m e r in E 0 . Regarding m 2 ,note that by definition
and equality (5) imply by the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) that
. Hence it is optimal for R to play b with probability one after m 2 in equilibrium E 0 .
We have now constructed an equilibrium E 0 in which exactly two messages m 3 and m e r trigger the mixed action (q R , 1 q R ). It follows by the argument given in step 1 that there exists an equilibrium E 00 featuring the following strategy profile. S uses δ 00 such that hand, R's strategy is the same in E 00 as in E 0 .
Starting from the S-optimal equilibrium E, we have now constructed an S-optimal equilibrium E 00 featuring one message less than E and which satisfies the same core properties as E: Message m 1 (m 2 ) is the unique message that triggers a (b) for sure, m 3 is the unique message triggering (q R , 1 q R ) while for any r 4, m r (if still used) is the unique message triggering mixed action (α r , 1 α r ) satisfying α r 2 (0, q R ) . One can iterate this procedure until obtaining an equilibrium in which only the three messages m 1 , m 2 , m 3 are used and trigger respectively a, b or (q R , 1 q R ). Note that in order to simplify exposition, we are assuming a finite number of messages. The arguments carry over to a continuum of messages.
Proof of Proposition 1
Outline We here prove Point a). Given Lemma 1.a), we may restrict ourselves to equilibria in which only m 1 , m 2 and m 3 are sent with positive probability and trigger respectively a for sure, b for sure and (q R , 1 q R ). The proof is organized as follows.
Step 1 describes the constraints that must be satisfied in an S-optimal equilibrium of the type described above.
Step 2 states additional properties that S's strategy must satisfy. We then consider two cases corresponding to respectively t 2 R t 1 S and t 2 R 2 ( 1 S , t 2 S ]. In the case of t 2 R t 1 S , we show that if there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium that features the threshold strategy z = t 1 S (step 3). In the case of t 2 R 2 (t 1 S , t 2 S ], we proceed through two steps. We first show that if there exists any Soptimal equilibrium, then one can construct an S-optimal equilibrium in which m 3 is used with a certain constant probability if σ 2 (t 1 S , t 2 R ] (step 4). We then show that if there exists an S-optimal equilibrium of the latter type, one can construct an S-optimal equilibrium which is a threshold equilibrium (step 5).
We introduce the following notation. We denote by P k (ω jm i , δ ) the probability of state ω conditional on receiving m i when applying prior P k (B), for k 2 fl, hg . Slightly abusing notation, we denote by P(m i jω, z) and P k (ω jm i , z ) the counterparts of P(m i jω, δ) and P k (ω jm i , δ ) for the case where S uses a threshold strategy featuring threshold z.
Step 1 a) An S-optimal equilibrium featuring a communication strategy δ specifying that only m 1 and m 2 are emitted with positive probability exists if and only if P h (B jm 1 , δ ) q R P l (B jm 2 , δ ).
b) An S-optimal equilibrium featuring a strategy δ in which messages m 1 , m 2 and m 3 are emitted with positive probability exists if and only if the above double inequality holds and furthermore P l (B jm 3 , δ ) q R .
Proof: We first consider Point a). An S-optimal equilibrium featuring a strategy δ in which only messages m 1 , m 2 are emitted with positive probability exists if and only if
The LHS inequality ensures that R chooses a with probability one after m 1 while the RHS inequality ensures that R picks b for sure after m 2 . Note that by definition it is always true that P l (B jm 1 , δ ) P h (B jm 1 , δ ) and that P l (B jm 2 , δ ) P h (B jm 2 , δ ).
We now consider Point b). Consider an equilibrium in which m 1 , m 2 and m 3 are emitted with positive probability. Besides the previously imposed conditions, it must also be that P l (B jm 3 , δ )
q R P h (B jm 3 , δ ) so as to ensure that R randomizes after m 3 . Given that in an S-optimal equilibrium, m 3 is only sent for σ t 1 S , it follows by Lemma F that
i.e. q S P h (Bjm 3 , δ). Hence q R P h (B jm 3 , δ ).
Step 2 a) In any S-optimal equilibrium featuring a communication strategy δ, δ 1 (σ) = 1 for
and δ 1 (σ)
b) It holds true that for σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 S ,
Proof: The equality (6) ensures a is played with probability q S for any σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 S as required by the S-optimal decision rule. Equality (6) implies δ 3 (σ) =
. From this latter equality and the fact that δ 1 (σ) + δ 3 (σ) 1 it follows that δ 1 (σ)
for all σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 S . Equation (7) directly follows from using
Step 3 Suppose that t 2 R t 1 S . If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium that features the threshold strategy z = t 1 S . Proof: Suppose first that t 2 R < t 1 S . Assume that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring a strategy δ that assigns positive probability to m 3 which triggers mixed action (q R , 1 q R ). We know from step 2 that it can only be true that δ 3 (σ) > 0 if σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 S . Given this and the fact that t 2 R < t 1 S , it must however then be the case by Lemma F that
, implying that R responds to m 3 by choosing action b for sure. It follows that δ cannot constitute an equilibrium. Note that if an S-optimal equilibrium is such that only m 1 and m 2 are used and trigger respectively a for sure and b for sure, then this equilibrium features the threshold strategy z = t 1 S . Suppose now that t 2 R = t 1 S . Assume that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring a strategy δ that assigns positive probability conditional on some signal to m 3 which triggers mixed action (q R , 1 q R ). We know from step 2 that it can only be true that
In order to have
, it must be that m 3 is only sent for σ = t 1 S . However, if this is the case then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium where δ is replaced by a δ 0 that is identical to δ except that for σ = t 1 S , S randomizes between m 1 and m 2 with probabilities (q S , 1 q S ) . This equilibrium is a threshold equilibrium with
If there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring a communication strategy δ, then there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring δ 0 defined as follows:
Proof: Since δ is featured in an S-optimal equilibrium, it holds true that
and P(m 2 jB,δ) P(m 2 jA,δ)
. Consider the strategy δ 0 28 defined above. We shall prove that all message constraints are satisfied given δ 0 .
Consider first the m 1 -constraint. Note that
for any σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 R as proved in the preceding step. Given t 1 R t 1 S and Lemma F, it holds true that R t 2
Using together inequality
, inequality (10) and the fact that δ 1 (σ)
.
Consider now the m 3 -constraint. Note that
The second above equality uses equation (7). Recall also that δ 1 (σ)
, inequality (11) and the fact that δ 1 (σ)
for any σ 2 t 1 S , t 2 R , the Ratio Lemma R (Point a)) implies that
. Consider finally the m 2 -constraint. Since δ
. Hence, δ 0 satisfies all message constraints and constitutes an S-optimal equilibrium.
Step 5 Suppose that t 2 R 2 (t 1 S , t 2 S ]. Suppose there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring a communication strategy δ satisfying δ(σ) = q S q R 1 q R , 0,
Then there exists a threshold equilibrium featuring z t 2 R . Proof: Suppose that there exists an S-optimal equilibrium featuring δ with δ(σ) =
We distinguish two cases. In Case 1,
. In Case 2,
. We begin with Case 1 and prove that in this case there exists a threshold equilibrium with z = t 2 S . Consider the m 3 -constraint. Since δ is used in an S-optimal equilibrium, it holds true that P(m 3 jB,δ) P(m 3 jA,δ)
. It follows immediately that
Consider the m 1 -constraint. Since δ is used in an S-optimal equilibrium, it is true that
. Note that
. We know furthermore that δ 1 (σ)
, inequality (12) and the fact that
Consider finally the m 2 -constraint. In a threshold equilibrium featuring z = t 2 S , m 2 is sent if and only if if σ t 2 S t 2 R . It follows by Lemma F that P l (Bjm 2 , t 2 S ) q S q R . Hence, the threshold strategy featuring z = t 2 S satisfies all equilibrium constraints corresponding to m 1 , m 2 and m 3 .
We now examine Case 2, thus assuming
. We shall show that we can find a threshold strategy featuring
and P l (Bjm 2 , z) q R , implying that the identified threshold strategy constitutes an equilibrium.
Consider first the m 3 -constraint. Note that
. To see this note the following. First, under δ and the threshold strategy z = t 2 R , m 3 is not sent for σ < t 1 S and sent with probability
while under the threshold equilibrium z = t 2 R , m 3 is sent with probability zero for σ > t 2 R . The stated inequality then follows by Lemma F. Using the fact that
is continuous and increasing in z as well as the double inequality
Recall that given the threshold strategy z > t 1 S , m 3 is sent with probability
S , z) while it is sent with probability zero otherwise. We thus have
Equalities (13) and (14) are compatible only in two scenarios, which we call I and II.
Scenario I is that the terms
and
are both zero. Scenario II is that either both of the above terms are strictly positive or both of these are strictly negative and additionally R z
For scenario II, we will now show that the two terms must actually both be strictly positive. Recall first that by definition
. Second, Lemma F implies that.
Combining these inequalities implies
Using the above double-inequality and the assumption that (15) and (16) Consider now the m 1 -constraint. We compare
. Using equation (7), one can write
Note that the numerator in the LHS ratio equals the numerator in the RHS ratio. The same holds true for denominators. It follows that the numerator and the denominator in the RHS ratio are both strictly positive.
In scenario I, the terms multiplying q R vanish and hence
. It follows that the m 1 -constraint is satisfied for the threshold strategy given by z , as it was satisfied for δ. In scenario II, as in any S-optimal equilibrium, δ is s.t. P h (B jm 1 , δ ) q R P h (B jm 3 , δ ) and thus P(B jm 1 , δ ) P(B jm 3 , δ ). Given equation (17), it thus follows that
Given this inequality and the equality (18), the R (Point b)) implies that ,δ) , so the m 1 -constraint is satisfied also in scenario II.
Consider finally the m 2 -constraint. In the constructed threshold equilibrium featuring a threshold z t 2 R , m 2 is sent if and only if σ t 2 R . It follows by Lemma F that P l (Bjm 2 , z ) q R . Hence, we have identified a z 2 [t 2 R , t 2 S ] such that the threshold strategy z satisfies all three message constraints and thus constitutes an equilibrium.
Preliminary analysis of constraints
In what follows, we shall study the incentive compatibility constraints of S and call them respectively m 1 -, m 2 -and m 3 -constraint. We first study each separately, examining comparative statics w.r.t. z, e and q R , and then study their pairwise relations. The lemmas appearing below are proved in the Online Appendix. We introduce some notation in what follows. In a threshold equilibrium featuring threshold z, we denote by P k (B jm i , z, q S , e ) the conditional probability of state B given message m i when applying prior P e k (B), for i 2 f2, 3g . The counterpart for m 1 is denoted by P k (B jm 1 , z, q R , q S , e ). Note that the latter expression is a function of q R in contrast to the other two, except in the special case of z = t 1 S (e). To stress the fact that P k (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), q R , q S , e) is independent of q R , we shall write P k (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e). Message m 3 is never sent in a threshold equilibrium with threshold t 1 S (e) so that P l (B m 3 , t 1 S (e), q S , e ) is not well defined. We slightly abuse notation and set P l (Bjm 3 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) = lim
P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ). Given i 2 f2, 3g and ω 2 fA, Bg, we let P(m i jz, q S , e, ω) denote the probability that m i is sent conditional on the state being ω. Let P(m 1 jz, q R , q S , e, ω) denote the equivalent for message m 1 . Given i 2 f2, 3g, k 2 fh, lg and ω 2 fA, Bg, we let P k (ω, m i , z, q S , e) denote the probability that the state is ω and that m i is sent when using prior P k (B). Let P k (ω, m 1 , z, q R , q S , e) denote the equivalent for message m 1 .
Lemma M1 i.a) Given e and q S , there is a threshold b z(e) 2 t 1 S (e), t 2 S (e) such that the following is true. If z < b z(e), there is no q R such that P h (B jm 1 , z, q R , q S , e ) q R . If z b z(e), there is a unique value Ψ (z, q S , e) 2 (0, q S ] such that P h (B jm 1 , z, q R , q S , e ) q R iff q R Ψ (z, q S , e) .
For z
b z(e) the expression Ψ (z, q S , e) satisfies P h (Bjm 1 , Ψ (z, q S , e) , q S , e) = Ψ (z, q S , e) and is continuous as well as strictly decreasing in z.
S (e), 0, q S , e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e. ii.b) There is a constant e 1 2 0, 1 2 such that P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) < q S iff e < e 1 . ii.c) If e e 1 then b z(e) = t 1 S (e). If e > e 1 then b z(e) > t 1 S (e).
Lemma M2 i.a) P l (B jm 2 , z, q S , e ) is continuous and strictly increasing in z i.b) P l (Bjm 2 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) > q S . ii.a) P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) is continuous and strictly decreasing in e. ii.b) There is a constant e 2 2 0, 1 2 such that P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) < q S iff e > e 2 .
Lemma M3 i.a) P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) < q S 8e > 0 and z. i.b) P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) is continuous and strictly increasing in z.
ii.a) P l (B m 3 , t 1 S (e), q S , e ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in e. ii.b) lim
S (e), q S , e ) approaches 0 for e ! 1 2 .
Lemma M4 a) There is an e 13 2 (0, e 1 ) such that
iff e < e 13 .
b) Given e e 13 it holds true that b z(e) = t 1 S (e) and that
c) If e > e 13 and P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) > Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e) then there exists some 
Proof of Proposition 2
Outline The proof of Point i. is given in steps 1-4 and is organized as follows. We first study the case of e e 13 and then examine the case of e > e 13 . The latter case subdivides into two subcases I and II. In subcase I, P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) > Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e) whereas in subcase II the latter inequality is reversed. The proof of Point ii. appears in step 5.
Step 1 a) A threshold equilibrium featuring z = t 1 S (e) exists if and only if P h (B jm 1 , z, q R , q S , e ) q R P l (B jm 2 , z, q S , e ).
b) A threshold equilibrium featuring z > t 1 S (e) exists if and only if the above inequalities hold and in addition P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) q R .
Proof: This was proved in step 1 of the proof of Proposition 1.
Step 2 Assume that e e 13 . There exists some threshold equilibrium if and only if
This implies that q R (e) = P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e). Proof: Let e e 13 so by definition (see Lemma M4) it holds true that
From Lemma M3, we know that P l (Bjm 3 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) q S , 8z . From Lemma M5, we know that P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) < P l (B jm 2 , z, q S , e ), 8z.
Consider first q R < P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e). There exists no t 1 S (e)-equilibrium as the m 1 -constraint is violated. We know from Lemma M3 that P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) is increasing in z so that for any z > t 1 S (e), P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) > P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e). Hence, for z > t 1 S (e), q R < P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) which means that the m 3 -constraint is violated. There thus exists no threshold equilibrium with z > t 1 S (e). Consider q R 2 P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e), P l (Bjm 3 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) . Given that it holds true that P l (Bjm 3 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) < P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e), it follows that q R P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e). For such values of q R , the m 1 -and the m 2 -constraints are thus satisfied in a t 1 S (e)-equilibrium. Hence, the t 1 S (e)-equilibrium (which does not involve m 3 ) exists. Consider q R 2 P l (Bjm 3 , t 1 S (e), q S , e), P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) . For any such q R , there exists a threshold equilibrium for the unique value of z at which q R = P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ).
For such a pair q R , z, the m 3 -constraint is satisfied because q R = P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ). The m 1 -constraint is satisfied because we know from Lemma M4 that for any z, P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) Ψ(z, q S , e). The m 2 -constraint is satisfied because q R = P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) while we know from Lemma M5 that P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) < P l (B jm 2 , z, q S , e ).
Consider finally q R 2 P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e), q S . In a putative t 2 S (e)-equilibrium, the m 1 -constraint is satisfied because we know from Lemma M5 that P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) > Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e). The m 3 -constraint is satisfied by assumption. The m 2 -constraint is satisfied because we know from Lemma M2 that q S < P l (Bjm 2 , t 2 S (e), q S , e). Hence the t 2 S (e)-equilibrium exists. Figure A below illustrates the case of e < e 13 . We assume the same information structure as in previous figures, setting q S = .85 and e = .12. Step 3 (Subcase I) Assume e > e 13 and P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) > Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e). There exists some threshold equilibrium if and only q R 2 [P l (B jm 3 , z , q S , e ), q S ] , where z is the unique value in the set b z(e), t 2 S (e) nft 1 S (e)g such that Ψ(z , q S , e) = P l (B jm 3 , z , q S , e ). This implies that q R (e) = P l (B jm 3 , z , q S , e ), for the above defined z .
Proof: We know from Lemma M4 that there exists some z 2 b z(e), t 2 S (e) n t 1 S (e) such that Ψ(z , q S , e) = P l (B jm 3 , z , q S , e ) while in contrast Ψ(z, q S , e) > P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) for z 2 [b z(e), z ) and Ψ(z, q S , e) < P l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ) for z 2 (z , t 2 S (e)]. Consider first q R < P l (B jm 3 , z , q S , e ). For such values of q R , there exists no z such that q R max fP l (B jm 3 , z, q S , e ), Ψ(z, q S , e)g . It follows that for such values of q R , there exists no threshold equilibrium.
Consider q R 2 P l (Bjm 3 , z , q S , e), P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) . For any such q R , there exists a threshold-z equilibrium for the value of z defined by the intersection of the horizontal line q R with P l (Bjm 3 , z, q S , e). For any such pair q R , z, we know that the m 1 -and m 3 -constraints are satisfied because it holds true that q R P l (Bjm 3 , z, q S , e) and q R Ψ(z, q S , e). For any such pair q R , z, the m 2 -constraint is satisfied because for any z, we know from Lemma M5 that P l (Bjm 3 , z, q S , e) < P l (Bjm 2 , z, q S , e).
Consider finally q R 2 P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q S , e), q S . For these values of q R , the t 2 S (e)-equilibrium exists. Indeed, the m 1 -and m 3 -constraints are satisfied because
Furthermore, the m 2 -constraint is satisfied because q S < P l (Bjm 2 , t 2 S (e), q S , e). Subcase I is illustrated in Figure B below. We assume the same information structure as in previous figures, setting q S = .85 and e = .19.
Figure B
Step 4 (Subcase II) Assume e > e 13 and P l (Bjm 3 , t 2 S (e), q R , q S , e) Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e). There exists a threshold-z equilibrium if and only if q R Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e). This implies that q R (e) = Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e). Proof: Consider first q R < Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e). Since Ψ(z, q S , e) is decreasing in z on b z(e), t 2 S (e) , there exists no z 2 b z(e), t 2 S (e) such that q R > Ψ(z, q S , e). Consider instead q R Ψ(t 2 S (e), q S , e). For any such q R , the t 2 S (e)-equilibrium exists. The m 1 -and m 3 -constraints are satisfied because
The m 2 -constraint is satisfied because q S < P l (Bjm 2 , t 2 S (e), q S , e) (see Lemma M2). Subcase II is illustrated in the figure below. We assume the same information structure as in previous figures, setting q S = .85 and e = .24.
Figure C
Step 5 This proves Point ii. Note that for e e 13 , we have q R (e) = P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e). We know from Lemma M1 that P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e. First, if e 1 6 = e 2 then e 12 is strictly between e 1 and e 2 while if e 1 = e 2 then e 12 = e 1 . Second, e 13 < minfe 12 , e 1 g.
Step 1 Let e 2 < e 1 . An S-optimal equilibrium using only two messages exists for some q R if and only if e e 12 .
Proof: Given that only two messages are allowed, there exists an S-optimal equilibrum if and only if there exists a threshold equilibrium with threshold t 1 S (e) (see Proposition 1.b)). A t 1 S (e)-equilibrium exists for some q R q S if and only if P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) min q S , P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) . To see this, recall that given q R q S , a t 1 S (e)-equilibrium exists if and only if q R satisfies
From Lemma M1 we know that P h (Bjm Proof: The fact that q 0 R (e) = P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) follows immediately from the necessary and sufficient conditions stated in step 1. Recall that P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) and P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) are both independent of q R .
Step 3 (Lower bound with three messages) Let e 2 < e 1 . If e e 13 then q R (e) = P h (Bjm 1 , t
If e 2 (e 13 , e 12 ] then q R (e) = P l (Bjm 3 , z, q R , q S , e) for some z > t 1 S (e) that satisfies P l (Bjm 3 , z, q R , q S , e) < P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e).
Proof: The characterization of q R (e) is provided in the proof of Proposition 2. We know from Lemma M4 that e 13 2 (0, e 12 ) and that if e > e 13 then
We also know from Lemma M3 that P l (Bjm 3 , z, q R , q S , e) is decreasing in z for z 2 t 1 S (e), t 2 S (e) .
Step 4 (Upper bound with two messages) Let e 2 < e 1 . If e e 2 then q 0 R (e) = q S . If e 2 (e 2 , e 12 ] then q 0 R (e) = P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) < q S . Proof: The fact that q 0 R (e) = min q S , P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) follows immediately from the necessary and sufficient conditions stated in step 1. The constant e 2 is such that
S (e), q S , e) < q S iff e > e 2 . We know from Lemma M6 that e 2 < e 12 given our assumption that e 2 < e 1 . It follows that if e e 2 then we have min q S , P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) = q S while if e > e 2 we instead have min q S , P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) = P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e).
Step 5 The lower bound q 0 Step 1 Let e 2 e 1 . An S-optimal equilibrium using only two messages exists for some q R if and only if e e 1 .
From Lemma M1 we know that P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) q s iff e e 1 . From Lemma 6, we know P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) iff e e 12 . Now, note that e 1 < e 12 . Consequently, if e 2 (0, e 1 ] then there exists a non empty interval of values of q R for which there exists a t 1 S (e)-equilibrium while if e > e 1 then no q R is compatible with a t 1 S (e)-equilibrium.
Step 2 (Lower bound with two messages) Let e 2 e 1 . If e e 1 then q 0 R (e) = P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e).
Proof: Identical to the proof of step 2 for Point i.
Step 3 (Lower bound with three messages) Let e 2 e 1 . If e e 13 then q R (e) = P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e).
If e 2 (e 13 , e 1 ] then q R (e) = P l (Bjm 3 , z, q R , q S , e) for some z > t 1 S (e) that satisfies
Proof: The characterization of q R (e) is provided in the proof of Proposition 2. We know from Lemma M4 that e 13 2 (0, e 1 ) and that if e > e 13 then
Step 4 (Upper bound with two messages) Let e 2 e 1 . If e e 1 then q 0 R (e) = q S . Proof: The fact that q 0 R (e) = min q S , P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) follows immediately from the necessary and sufficient conditions stated in step 1. From Lemma M2, recall that the constant e 2 is such that if e < e 2 then P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) > q S . Given that e 1 e 2 , it follows that for any e e 1 , min q S , P l (Bjm 2 , t 1 S (e), q S , e) = q S so that q 0 R (e) = q S .
Step 5 The lower bound q 0 R (e) = P h (Bjm 1 , t 1 S (e), 0, q S , e) is continuous and strictly increasing in e for e 2 (0, e 1 ]. The upper bound q 0 R (e) = q S for e 2 (0, e 1 ]. Proof: This was proved in Lemma M1.
Proof of Proposition 4
Outline Steps 1-2 prove Point i. whereas steps 3-4 prove Point ii.
Step 1 Given q S , q R , e, the simple D-equilibrium exists iff P e l (B) 1 P e l (B)
S (e)) and apply Lemma F.
Step . Note that for any e 2 (0, increases in e. It follows that q D R (e) is strictly increasing in e until it reaches value q S , after which it remains equal to q S .
Proof of Proposition 5 Outline
Step 1 analyzes equilibrium and payoffs in the absence of ambiguity. Steps 2 and 3 analyze equilibrium and payoffs in the presence of ambiguity with a focus on the simple D-equilibrium prediction.
Step 3 shows the continuity in q R and e of the expected payoff of S in the simple D-equilibrium under ambiguity e > 0 and prior P e k (B).
Step 4 is about comparing expected payoffs under the no ambiguity and the ambiguity scenario.
Step 5 uses the previously established facts in order to conclude. In what follows, we slightly abuse notation and let q R (0) = lim e!0 q R (e) . The threshold q R (0) thus denotes the lowest value of q R for which influential communication is possible in the absence of ambiguity.
We similarly let t i S (0) = lim e!0 t i S (e), for i 2 f1, 2g .
Step 1 Given e = 0 and q R < q R (0) , the unique equilibrium outcome is such that R always picks action b. R obtains expected payoff Π 0 (q S ) = 1 2 q S . Proof: Recall that under e = 0, if q R 6 = q R (0) the S-optimal equilibrium is the only equilibrium with influential communication. For e = 0 and q R < q R (0) there exists no S-optimal equilibrium. It follows that given e = 0 and q R < q R (0) , there is no influential communication. In the absence of any influential communication and given a unique prior P(B) = 1 2 , R simply picks the ex ante optimal action which is b given q R q S < 1 2 .
Step 2 a) For any e 2 0, Step 3 Denote by Π D (e, q S , q R , k) the expected payoff of S given decision rule D (q S , q R , e) under prior P e k (B), k 2 fl, hg. Π D (e, q S , q R , k) is continuous in q R and e. Proof: The expected payoff of S given decision rule D (q S , q R , e) is given by To see this, recall that under decision rule D(q S , q R , e), R plays b with probability 1 q R for σ < t 2 S (e) and plays b with probability one for σ t 2 S (e). It follows that given state ω 2 fA, Bg , under decision rule D(q S , q R , e) R chooses b with probability F ω (t 2 S (e))(1 q R ) + 1 F ω (t 2 S (e)). R instead chooses a with probability F ω (t 2 S (e)q R . The expression Π D (e, q S , q R , k) is trivially continuous in q R . It is continuous in e because t 2 S (e) and P e k (B) are continuous in e.
Step 4 There exists an e > 0 and a function q R (e) defined on [0, e ) and satisfying q R (e) < q R (0) 8e 2 [0, e ) such that the following is true. If the pair e, q R satisfies e 2 [0, e ) and q R 2 [q R (e), q R (0)], then Π D (e, q S , q R , k) > Π 0 (q S ), 8k 2 fl, hg .
Proof: For fixed e, q S , q R , k, we compare the welfare of S in an equilibrium implementing D (q S , q R , e) to S's welfare in an equilibrium in which b is always chosen. Note first that
This is true because t 1 S (0) = t 2 S (0). Second, note that for any q R q S
To see this note that given e = 0, S favours a scenario in which D (q S , q R , 0) is implemented to one in which R always chooses action b. Recall that t 1 S (0) = t 2 S (0) and note that for e = 0, the S-optimal decision rule is to choose a for sure below t 1 S (0) and b for sure above t 1 S (0). The decision rule D (q S , q R , 0) admittedly differs from the S-optimal decision rule but it dominates the "always pick b" rule. It yields a strictly higher payoff than the "always pick b" rule for σ < t 1 S (0) by ensuring that a is picked with positive probability. It yields the same payoff as the latter for σ t 1 S (0). A special case of the inequality (20) is
Note that Π D (e, q S , q R , l) and Π D (e, q S , q R , h) are continuous in e and q R . The statement follows.
Step 5 Given a pair e, q R satisfying e 2 (0, e ) and q R 2 h max 
i there exists an equilibrium implementing decision rule D (q S , q R , e) and furthermore min fΠ D (e, q S , q R , l), Π D (e, q S , q R , h)g > Π 0 (q S ).
